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This blog was taken from Dr. Willow’s panel contribution at
the Prospects for Democracy in Sudan event hosted by LSE’s Con ict
and Civil Society Research Unit on 11 October 2019. This article was
originally published on the Newcastle University blog platform.
Sudan Uprising: the gra ti reads ‘Just Fall’- the slogan of the revolution.
Source: Hind Mekki, Flickr.
Drawing on my book Civil Uprisings in Modern Sudan I will be
discussing the parallels between today’s popular uprising (2019) and
Sudan’s two previous popular uprisings, the October Revolution of 1964
and the April Intifada of 1985. The leaders of those two uprisings were
ultimately unable to establish a democratic political order in the long
term, as the parliamentary systems they created were ultimately
overthrown by military coups in 1969 and 1989 respectively. These
military coups were launched in the name of ideologies that perceived
parliamentary democracy as either too Western, too chaotic or too
elitist. They ultimately lost their ideological character and brought about
rampant corruption and authoritarianism, intensifying the exploitation of
the periphery of Sudan and replacing public institutions with the
‘political marketplace’, a concept that Alex de Waal discusses..
So how do you avoid this trap? Well, what I wrote at the end of my Civil
Uprisings book, is that the two most important divisions in Sudanese
politics that had to be resolved for a transition to democracy to succeed
were between the centre and the periphery, and between the secularists
and the advocates of religious politics.
Centre-periphery divide
The key failing of the past two uprisings was that they began in the
urban riverain areas and they failed to transcend the divide between the
centre and the marginalised regions. The pattern of exploitation of the
periphery by the centre continued, and the civil wars along with it. This
is not to say that these uprisings did not offer moments of possibility. In
1964 the man who brought Sudan’s judges onto the street was Abd al-
Majid Imam, a co-founder of today’s Sudan Congress Party who hailed
from the periphery. The revolutionary government that followed October
appointed Clement Mboro, a southerner, Minister of Interior, and he
immediately set about trying to reform what was admittedly then a
much less in ated security apparatus. However, the core of the
revolution was in Sudan’s urban centre. Because the leftists and liberals
of the cities were unable to revolutionise the periphery as well, those
moments of new social possibility were lost, and the more conservative
forces in Sudanese politics were able to mobilise the periphery against
their opponents in the cities – whether that be Sadiq and Ahmad al-
Mahdi marching the Ansar in Khartoum to strongarm the  rst
transitional government into submission in 1965, or the Islamist
governments bringing various militias trained in the periphery to crush
urban dissidents since 1989.
Now, what is different in 2019? The most important point is that the
revolutionary moment has gone on longer. In 1964 it took 5 days for the
Abboud regime to fall, in 1985 it took the Nimeiri regime 11 days, and
today it took the al-Bashir regime 4 months to fall. This shows how
entrenched the al-Bashir regime was, but it has also meant that there
has been much more time for today’s revolutionary activists to call for
more representation for marginalised groups within the transitional
arrangement. It has also created more time for those marginalised on
the basis of gender and age to demand representation. For example, the
transitional government, although far from being fully gender balanced,
has more representation of women than any other in Sudanese history,
and just yesterday we saw the appointment of Sudan’s  rst female chief
justice.
Another factor to consider is that the rebellious periphery is a lot closer
to home now than was the case in 1964 and 1985. Back then, armed
opposition to the government was mainly restricted to the now seceded
south, with the war in south Kordofan only just beginning in 1985.
Today, the rebellion has extended further into the north including of
course Darfur, and the departed regime’s perpetration of mass atrocities
in that region has ensured that the issue of justice for the periphery is
now one of the foremost slogans of the demonstrators even at the
riverain centre.
Yet at the same time, General Hemedti, the pseudo-champion and arch-
nemesis of today’s revolution, has still been able to mobilise forces
within the periphery through his notorious Rapid Support Force militia.
He instructed them to act against today’s urban revolutionaries, most
notably of course during the awful massacre that occurred on 3 June
this year.
In April, the urban political forces began to negotiate with the
Transitional Military Council independently of the rebel groups within
the Forces of Freedom and Change and Sudan Call. It looked like the
classic scenario where regimes fall but regional divisions continue
might repeat itself. However, the transitional government and rebels
have now begun to implement peace talks. We still need to be cautious
for two reasons –  rst of all, because post-uprising peace talks have
happened before (as at the round table conference on the south in
1965), and failed to stop the ongoing con ict, and secondly because the
rebels in Darfur and the other peripheries are made up of an array of
different movements and factions, some of which have a more genuine
commitment to democracy and social progress than others. As Alex de
Waals research shows us, there has been a long term pattern of
marketised politics whereby rebel agendas begin to mirror regime
agendas, and peace talks are simply used to divide wealth and
resources between the government and its armed opponents. Rebel
politics are also very male dominated, which sits awkwardly with an
urban uprising that is trying to prioritise the representation of women.
So in this context, it is important to note that groups such as the Darfur
Women’s Protection Network and the General Coordination of Displaced
People and Refugees are demanding that they participate in the talks.
More broadly, there is a question of whether the disjuncture between
civil opposition in the urban centre, and armed opposition in the
periphery, will continue.
Back during the 1964 October Revolution there were major urban
protests in the leading cities of Darfur like Nyala and al-Ubayyid. The
issue back then was that events developed very rapidly in Khartoum,
and without the forms of electronic media we have today it was harder
for the citizens of the urban centre to be aware of what was going on in
the peripheries, and vice versa. The fact that both the uprising and the
transition are happening in slow motion today, at least in contrast with
the events of yester-year, is actually to the advantage of the periphery.
And we are seeing peaceful protest having an impact on the periphery.
Just a few weeks ago, the resistance committees in Nyala began to set
up camps to educate the youth on peaceful demonstration, and
following clashes in Nyala there were solidarity marches for Darfur all
over Sudan. Similarly, parties like the Sudan Communist Party
announced their solidarity with the recent protests against toxic gold
mining in Talodi in South Kordofan, and ultimately these protests led the
cabinet yesterday to outlaw the use of mercury in gold mining. Thus,
there are positive signs of protest on the periphery feeding back into
political action at the centre.
Secularism and religion
Coming to the second point, can the rift between secularism and
religious politics be overcome? At the moment, this looks unlikely- given
the Islamist character of the regime, the mass popular hostility to
Islamism displayed during the urban protests, and the ambivalent
reaction of the various non-NCP Islamists to the uprising itself.
Nevertheless, it is worth observing that in the great democratic wave
that occurred slightly further north in 2011, the one country which
escaped a return to authoritarianism was Tunisia, where both Islamists
and secularists were willing to embrace parliamentary politics, and as
research by the likes of Cavatorta and Merone has shown, Rashid
Ghannushi’s al-Nahda party has moved away from the old rhetoric of
hakimiyya and Islamic states, towards an approach that is
accommodating of pluralism and everyday politics. Elsewhere, in Syria,
Libya and Egypt, military dictators and warlords exploited the divide
between Islamists and secularists to justify returning to, or keeping an
authoritarian mode of politics.
However, the case in Sudan is different, not just because Sudan has a
very different cultural makeup to those other countries but because
unlike the various movements associated with the Arab spring, the
Sudanese uprising was an uprising against an Islamist regime.
We have seen the scenario both in Sudan’s history and during the Arab
Spring where there is a popular uprising against a secular or semi-
secular regime, the Islamists give it lukewarm backing, and then win out
in elections, but we have not seen whether this scenario can repeat
itself when the regime that was overthrown was itself Islamist in
character. It is worth observing that unlike Tunisia, Sudan has other
religiously oriented, business orientated parties that might occupy the
political space the Islamists vacate, such as the National Umma Party
and Democratic Unionist Party which have acted as centre right in
previous parliamentary systems in Sudan. Yet the Islamists still have
considerable  nancial and media power, as well as in uence within the
security services, important foreign allies and in the case of the Popular
Congress Party, an ambiguous relationship with the most powerful of
the Darfur rebel movements, the Justice and Equality Movement. At the
moment they are, in Johnsonesque fashion, pushing for early
elections in the hope that they will be able to capitalise on their existing
 nancial and media power before the revolutionary transitional
processes reverse the effects of 30 years of Islamist rule.
Islamism with moderation?
So, can they moderate, or will they just try to bring back the old system?
The leadership of the Popular Congress Party (PCP) who represented
the Islamist opposition have often been fond of highlighting their
relationship with Rashid al-Ghannushi, so as to associate themselves
with the moderation of the al-Nahda party that he brought into
democratic politics in Tunisia. Unfortunately, the Islamist opposition in
Sudan have a somewhat more tainted history than al-Ghannushi in
Tunisia. The leaders of the largest Islamist opposition groups, Ghazi
Salahaddin and Ali al-Haj, were both major players in 1985 when the
National Islamic Front refused to join the opposition National Alliance
opposition umbrella during the last Intifada, and they were leading
 gures in the National Islamic Front when it engineered the coup that
brought Omar al-Bashir into power in 1989. The pattern in Sudanese
history is that politicians who participated in military regimes have been
barred from participation in the subsequent parliamentary regimes, and
already Ghazi Salahaddin and Ali al-Haj, along with others, have been
the subjects of a lawsuit on account of their role in the overthrowing the
1989 democracy.
Generational revolutions
For the older generation of Islamists, the problematic issue is not so
much the question of whether they have moderated on a philosophical
level as much as their association with the old regime, its networks and
its crimes. And that is why, when the PCP vacillated throughout early
2019 over whether to back the uprising or not, that very much re ected
a divide between the leadership under Ali al-Haj and the youth of the
party, who embraced the generational character of the revolution,
ignored their party leadership, which was composed purely of Islamists
over the age of 60, and went to the streets. In the case of the Popular
Congress Party, we can only hope that this generational divide will lead
to the emergence of a far less exclusivist mode of religious politics.
That brings me back to the generational revolution. This same
generational revolution has been happening within some of the other
parties of the more conservative opposition over the last decade, with
the youth of the National Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist
Party protesting against the soft approach towards the regime of their
aging patriarchs, both of whom have been in control of the party since
the 1960s. One of the reasons that the popularity of the Sudan
Congress Party has risen so much during the intifada is because it has
relatively young leaders – it is the party of the last Intifada, in effect.
The 1964 October Revolution saw a generational transition within a
small elite – hopefully this time it will be more comprehensive. The
university students today are more diverse in terms of gender, ethnicity
and regional origin than was the case in the 1960s. They are not
encumbered by the old way of doing politics that binds the older men,
and they may well move away from the strict dichotomy of Islamism
and secularism. But even if they do that, they still need to extend their
revolution beyond the urban centres. It is also worth noting that Ali al-
Haj has threatened to topple the transitional regime by setting up a
‘shadow government’ in the regions, and that returns me to the original
point that the urban democrats need to bring the peripheries into the
new order if they are to prevent those peripheries being manipulated to
challenge their revolution.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of
the Con ict Research Programme, the London School of Economics
and Political Science, or the UK Government.
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